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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINIST ATIVE REMEmDIES IN
SELECTIVE SERVICE CASES
United States v. Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973)
After appellant was denied classification' as a conscientious objec-
tor,2 he unsuccessfully pursued his administrative appeals. 3 Although
I. A Selective Service registrant is classified at a formal meeting of the local
board at which a majority of the members are present. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.56 (1973).
Classification is based on written information in the registrant's file and oral statements
of the registrant or his witnesses made at any personal appearance. Id. § 1623.1(b).
Each registrant is presumed to be I-A, i.e. available for military service, unless eligi-
bility for a deferment or exemption is clearly established. Id. § 1622.1(a). See also
SEL. SERV. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL 1072-78 (1968). Definitions of the various
Selective Service classifications are found at 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10-.46 (1973).
2. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1970) exempts conscientious objectors from military
service. This statute has been implemented by 32 C.F.R. § 1622.14(a) (1973), which
provides:
In class 1-0 shall be placed every registrant who would have been classified
I-A but for the fact that he has been found, by reason of religious, ethical, or
moral belief, to be conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form and to be conscientiously opposed to participation in combatant or non-
combatant training and service in the Armed Forces.
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sicurella v. United States,
348 U.S. 385 (1955). See generally Comment, Selective Service Law: The Selective
Conscientious Objector, 55 IowA L. REv. 288 (1969); Comment, The Conscientious Ob-
jector and the First Amendment: There but for the Grace of God ..... 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 79, 95-105 (1966).
Defendant submitted a fully completed Selective Service Form 150, Special Form for
Conscientious Objector, to his local board outlining his religious beliefs and objections
to war, which developed as a result of his membership in the Episcopal Church and
which were embodied in the Nicene Creed. He included letters from seven persons-
friends, minister, and family-attesting to his beliefs and sincerity, as well as two
pamphlets dealing with religion, war, and conscience. Appellant admitted participation
in R.O.T.C. for two years while in college, but pointed out that such participation was
mandatory for graduation, and that he had led a successful campaign to make the pro-
gram voluntary. Finally, he pointed to his active participation in various peace move-
ments and pacifist groups. See Brief for Appellant, App. at 10-25, United States v.
Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973).
3. Pursuant to 32 C.F.R. H8 1624.1-.3 (1973), appellant, accompanied by his cler-
gyman, appeared before the local board following his initial classification, but the board
voted to retain appellant in the I-A classification. Appellant appealed pursuant to id.
§ 1626.3, and the State Appeal Board undertook a de novo consideration of appellant's
file. By a vote of 2 to 1 he was retained in class I-A. The one dissenting vote al-
lowed appellant to appeal to the Presidential Appeal Board, as provided by id. § 1627.1,
but this appeal was also unsuccessful.
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appellant refused to submit to induction, the United States Attorney
refused to prosecute. 4 Subsequently, on orders of the state director,
the local board reopened 5 appellants file and requested that he appear
for a "discretionary" interview.6  Appellant refused to appear,7 did
not appeal the resulting I-A classification, 8 and again refused to submit
to induction. In a criminal prosecution for refusal to submit to in-
duction,9 the district court held that appellant's failure to exhaust ad-
4. After reviewing appellants file, the United States Attorney refused to prosecute
for two reasons: (1) he found no basis in fact for denying the requested 1-0 classi-
fication; and (2) the local and appellate boards had failed to state their reasons for
denying appellants request. See Brief for Appellant, App. at 50-51, United States v.
Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973).
5. See 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a)(1) (1973).
The effect of a reopening is to start the administrative classification process over
from the beginning, as if the registrant had never been classified. The registrant has
the same rights to an appearance and appeal as before, and the failure to exercise these
rights again operates as a waiver. See id. §§ 1625.13, 1641.3.
The thrust of most registrants' attacks on the Selective Service System has been
to persuade the courts to force the local boards to reopen, thereby giving the registrants
another chance to present their cases. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S.
410 (1970); Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967). See generally Sed-
ler, The Procedural Defense in Selective Service Prosecutions. The View From With-
out and Within, 56 IowA L. Rav. 1121, 1142-71 (1971). In Holby appellant attacked
the reopening policy from the opposite direction by challenging the authority of the
System to force him to present his case again when no change had occurred either
in the facts material to his request or the applicable law. See Brief for Appellant at
15, United States v. Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973).
6. Such a discretionary interview is not provided for by statute and is not meant
to replace the right of personal appearance guaranteed by 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2 (1973).
Local Board Memorandum No. 41 (subsequently rescinded August 27, 1970) instituted
discretionary interviews, the sole purpose of which was to provide the local board and
the registrant another chance to discuss the registrant's file. 4 SEL. SERv. L. RP. 2174
(1968).
Appellant was called to appear for such an interview on two occasions--once imme-
diately following the United States Attorney's refusal to prosecute and again after the
state director ordered that his file be reopened. In both instances he requested that
his counsel and a stenographer be allowed to accompany him to the interview since
he was under threat of prosecution, but the local board refused, relying on 32 C.F.R.
§ 1624.1(b) (1972), which prohibited the presence of a registrant's counsel at a per-
sonal appearance. Appellant then refused to appear, stating that there was nothing
more he could add to the record. See Brief for Appellant, App. at 58, United States
v. Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973).
7. See note 6 supra.
8. The effect of a I-A classification is discussed at note I supra.
9. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970). See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 402 U.S.
479 (1971); United States v. Bush, 476 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
McBride, 468 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kekich, 463 F.2d 1203 (6th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Pringle, 438 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v.
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ministrative remedies barred the defense that his classification was in-
valid.1" The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held: A
Selective Service registrant, having once exhausted his administrative
remedies, is not required to re-exhaust those remedies if there has been
no change in his circumstances or the applicable law, and the record
before the local board is complete. 1
Houston, 433 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Zmuda, 423 F.2d 757 (3d
Cir. 1970).
10. United States v. Holby, 345 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). A Selective Serv-
ice registrant who is unsatisfied with his classification and seeks judicial review has
three alternatives. First, he may refuse to submit to induction and challenge the valid-
ity of the classification in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); United States
v. Bender, 469 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Williams, 420 F.2d 288 (10th
Cir. 1970); Wills v. United States, 384 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1967); Glover v. United
States, 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961). See generally Note, Judicial Review of the Selec-
five Service Classifications, 56 VA. L. REv. 1288 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Judicial
Review]; 40 FORD tAM L. REv. 617 (1972); 1971 Wis. L. R.v. 318. Secondly, he may
submit to induction and challenge the validity of the induction order by an application
for discharge. Conscientious objector discharges are the subject of DOD Directive No.
1300.6 (Aug. 20, 1971), implemented by Army Reg. 635-20, Air Force Reg. No. 35-
24, and Bupersnote 1900. If the discharge is denied, the applicant may petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469
F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1972); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970);
Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970). This procedure is not advisable for
applicants whose conscientious objector views "crystallized" prior to induction. See
DOD Directive No. 1300.6, at pt. mII, c; Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3d
Cir. 1967). -But cf. Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971). Courts have regarded
such submission to induction as a waiver of the applicant's rights to the requested
classification. See Shaw, Selective Service Litigation and the 1967 Statute, 48 Mn.
L. REv. 33, 78-87 (1970) (cases collected). See generally Brahms, They Step to a
Different Drummer: A Critical Analysis of the Current Department of Defense Posi-
tion Vis-A-Vis In-Service Conscientious Objectors, 47 Mm. L. REv. 1 (1970); Comment,
God, the Army, and Judicial Review: The In-Service Conscientious Objector, 56 CstW.
L. REV. 379 (1968). Thirdly, the registrant may petition for an injunction barring
his induction. See, e.g., Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Oestereich v, Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.
No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967). This alternative has shortcomings, however, be-
cause 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (1970), passed in response to Wolff, allows pre-
induction judicial review only in criminal prosecutions. See generally Donahue, The
Supreme Court vs. Section 1O(bX3) of the Selective Service Act: A Study in Ducking
Consitutional Issues, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 908 (1970); O'Neil, Review of Selective Serv-
ice Reclassifications. 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 536 (1969); Tigar & Zweben, Selective
Service: Some Certain Problems and Some Tentative Answers, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
510 (1969); Winick, Direct Judicial Review of the Actions of the Selective tService
System, 69 MICH. L. REv. 55 (1970).
1I. United States v. Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973). Appellant also attacked
the validity of his induction order on two grounds: (1) there was no basis in fact
for denial of his 1-0 request; and (2) the local and appellate boards had failed to
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a well-estab-
lished, if inconsistently applied, 12 rule of administrative law. Generally,
the doctrine is invoked, with limited exceptions, to preclude judicial
review of an administrative ruling unless the petitioner has availed him-
self of all the opportunities for review prescribed by the statutes govern-
ing the particular agency.18 Several reasons for the doctrine have been
give reasons for rejecting his request, thus denying him due process of law. The court
of appeals found for appellant on both of these allegations and dismissed the indict-
ment.
Holby is a prosecution for refusal to submit to induction. Although registrants no
longer are being drafted, the decision of the court of appeals nevertheless is significant.
First, several thousand young men are awaiting trial for refusal to submit to induction.
Secondly, the reactivation of the military draft is a substantial possibility considering
the limited success of the "all-volunteer" Army to date. See generally The Armed
Forces Without Drafting-Results So Far, U.S. Nnws & WoRLD REP., Aug. 6, 1973,
at 41; Doubts About an All-Volunteer Army, Tim NEw REPuIrLIc, Mar. 3, 1973, at
9-11; Volunteer Army-Is It Working?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 6, 1973, at
38-40. Thirdly, the decision could have an effect on the application of the exhaustion
of remedies doctrine in proceedings before other administrative agencies. See notes
21 & 36 infra.
12. Judicial application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is dependent to a great extent on the statutes which control the different administrative
agencies. The Supreme Court has applied the exhaustion doctrine strictly if the statute
prescribes the required administrative procedures and limits appeal from the administra-
tive decision. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Myers v. Beth-
lehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). But see McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185 (1969); Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149 (1964); Allen v. Grand Cent.
Airoraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); Public Utilities Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
13. See generally 3 K. DAvis, ADINmiSTRATVE LAw TREATSE § 20.01 et seq. (Supp.
1965) [hereinafter cited as DAVIs]; L. JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTIoN 424-58 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFB]; L. JAm & N. NATnANSON, AD.
miTATIvE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 328-61 (1968); Jaffe, The Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 327 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
haustion of Remedies]; Federal Administrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 DuKE
L.J. 149, 305-11; Note, The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 18
WAYNE L. Rsv. 1403 (1972).
Courts recognize limited exceptions to the application of the exhaustion doctrine.
First, courts have not applied the doctrine if the petitioner can show that the agency
committed a clear mistake of law. Mistakes of law take the form of mistaken interpre-
tation of the applicable rules and regulations, mistaken construction of jurisdictional
statutes, or mistakes of constitutional law. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395
U.S. 185 (1969) (local board erred by interpreting "sole surviving son" classification
as requiring existence of family unit); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) (NLRB
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering inclusion of professional and non-professional em-
ployees in same bargaining unit); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111
(1944) (NLRB did not misinterpret law by classifying newsboys as "employees");
United States v. Williams, 420 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1970) (registrant not afforded pro-
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advanced. First, there is a need for a complete factual record upon
which the agency may exercise its expertise and discretion.'" Secondly,
the agency should be given every opportunity to correct its own mis-
cedural due process); Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d
Cir. 1967) (abridgement of registrant's rights to due process); Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Boyd, 207 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1962) (CAB acted beyond its jurisdiction in
suspending operating permit pending fact-finding investigation).
Secondly, courts will allow an exception to application of the doctrine when the pe-
titioner shows that appeal within the administrative agency would be futile. Futility
of appeal must be shown by a system regulation, a consistent course of decision
by the agency, or an inability of the agency to grant the necessary relief. See, e.g.,
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (inabil-
ity of agency to grant relief needed to correct wrong); Martinez v. Richardson, 472
F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973) (inability of agency to grant necessary relief); United
States v. Hayden, 445 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971) (consistent course of decision against
granting registrant desired classification); Koepke v. Fontecchio, 177 F.2d 125 (9th
Cir. 1949) (challenge of agency regulation within agency would be futile). Informal
policies and oral directives of the agency are not a sufficient showing to excuse a fail-
ure to exhaust for futility. See Sedler, supra note 5, at 1183-85.
Thirdly, courts will permit an exception to application of the doctrine if the peti-
tioner will suffer irreparable injury while waiting for the administrative processes to
be completed. See, e.g., Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 434 (1948); Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923); Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotia-
tion Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Finally, if the petitioner demonstrates an extreme ignorance of the procedures of the
administrative agency, thus negating any intelligent waiver of appeal rights, the courts
will make an exception to the application of the exhaustion doctrine. Little or no
formal education is the basis for such a showing, and the exception is usually applicable
only to Selective Service cases. See, e.g., United States v. Rabe, 466 F.2d 783 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Batson, 334 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Mo. 1971); United States
v. Harris, 302 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Ore. 1968).
14. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969); see Parisi v. Davidson,
405 U.S. 34, 38 (1972); McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 485 (1971); cf.
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432
F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Great N. Ry., 337 F.2d 243, 246 (8th
Cir. 1964); Meekins, Inc. v. Boire, 320 F.2d 445, 450 (5th Cir. 1963); United States
v. Fritz Properties, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1950). See generally DAvis
§ 20.01; JAFFE 424-25; Exhaustion of Remedies 327. In McKart the Court drew the
distinction between classifications which were simply a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion and those which required the exercise of expertise and discretion by the agency.
395 U.S. at 198 n.16. Whether the Court intended this distinction to be conclu-
sive has been questioned in a line of cases in the Fourth Circuit. In United States
v, Davis, 413 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1969), the court indicated that the Supreme Court,
by remanding the appellate court's decision in United States v. McNeil, 401 F.2d 527
(4th Cir. 1968), vacated, 395 U.S. 463 (1969), had "undermined" the McKart distinc-
tion. In McNeil the Fourth Circuit had refused to review a registrant's claim as a
conscientious objector because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Mc-
Neil was precisely the type of case that the Supreme Court had distinguished in Mc-
Kart. See generally Judicial Review 1296-302.
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takes, a policy that advances the related goal of judicial economy by
eliminating unnecessary judicial review.' 5 Finally, the administrative
process will be impaired if petitioners are encouraged to bypass agency
channels.' 6
The exhaustion doctrine most often is applied when a party prema-
turely seeks judicial intervention in an administrative proceeding.17
When review is denied, the applicant simply returns to pursue the ad-
ministrative processes.' 8 A more perplexing situation arises when, as
in the case of many Selective Service registrants, the party seeking ju-
dicial review is under criminal prosecution for failure to comply with
an agency order. 9 In such a case administrative remedies are no
15. See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 38 (1972); McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971); MeKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969); Ster-
ling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Hayes v. Cape Henlopen
School Dist., 341 F. Supp. 823, 832 (D. Del. 1972). See generally DAVIs § 20.01;
JA1F ' 424-25; Exhaustion of Remedies 327.
16. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 485 (1971); see, e.g., McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969); United States v. Houston, 433 F.2d 939
(2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Zmuda, 423 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1970).
17. See, e.g., FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1964); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuild-
ing Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Meekins, Inc. v. Boire, 320 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1963);
Neisloss v. Bush, 293 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 236 F.2d 816
(5th Cir. 1956); Shank v. FPC, 236 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956).
18. See, e.g., Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 299 (1973) (com-
plaint of antitrust conspiracy stayed to give administrative officials time to act); Bris-
tol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d Cir. 1972) (petition to force FTC to
issue subpoenas dismissed with directions to reopen informal negotiations); Meekins,
Inc. v. Boire, 320 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1963) (petition dismissed with directions to ICC
to hold hearings).
19. While a limited number of prosecutions arise from other administrative pro-
ceedings when the Government attempts to enforce statutory penalties against persons
who fail to adhere to administrative rulings, the majority of criminal prosecutions oc-
cur in the Selective Service System. Other administrative agencies usually deal with
groups or businesses that retain legal counsel to advise them of the proper procedures
and how to avoid criminal prosecutions, whereas the registrants of the Selective Service
System usually are unfamiliar with and unable to learn about the intricacies of the
System. One example of a quasi-criminal action outside the Selective Service System
is the enforcement of penalties for ignoring crop quotas under the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-393 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. Sykes,
310 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Jeffcoat, 272 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1959);
United States v. Donaldson, 264 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1959); Corpstein v. United States,
262 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Bonderer, 139 F. Supp. 391 (W.D.
Mo. 1956). A few similar cases have arisen under ICC regulations. See, e.g., United
States v. Apicella, 148 F. Supp. 457 (D.N.J. 1957).
For Selective Service cases, see McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971);
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549
(1944); United States v. Nelson, 476 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bush,
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longer available to the defendant and the application of the exhaustion
doctrine may deprive him of a hearing on one or more substantive de-
fenses.2"
The Supreme Court has stated that the exhaustion doctrine "is not
to be inflexibly applied," 21 and that its application in criminal prosecu-
tions is justified only when "the interests underlying the exhaustion rule
clearly outweigh the severe burden [of possible imprisonment] imposed
upon the [defendant] if he is denied judicial review. 22  Thus, when
the burden on the defendant predominates, the failure to exhaust will
476 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. McBride, 468 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Kekich, 463 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hernandez,
453 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dombrouski, 445 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
1971 ); United States v. Pringle, 438 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Hous-
ton, 433 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Zmnda, 423 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Lockhart, 420 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smogor,
411 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1969); DuVernay v. United States, 394 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1968), afj'd, 394 U.S. 309 (1969); Thompson v. United States, 380 F.2d 86 (10th
Cir. 1967). See generally Judicial Review; 40 FoRnIIAm L. REv. 617 (1972); 1971 Wis.
L. REv. 318.
20. At the time an applicant is charged as a defendant in a criminal prosecuton
for failure to obey an agency order, the administrative processes are closed. If the
applicant/defendant is convicted, he is imprisoned or fined. When the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine is applied at the trial, the defendant may not be able
to raise one or more of his defenses to the charges against him. See, e.g., Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971); United States v. Bush, 476 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir.
1973); United States v. McBride, 468 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kek-
ich, 463 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1972).
21. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969). See also McGee v.
United States, 402 U.S. 479, 483 (1971). McKart has been relied on extensively for
this proposition in cases involving agencies other than the Selective Service. See, e.g.,
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Civil Service Commission); Pepsico, Inc. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 179, 192 (2d Cir. 1972)
(dissenting opinion); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116, 1118 (2d Cir. 1972);
Bannercroft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
City of New York v. New York Tel. Co., 468 F.2d 1401, 1402 (Tem. Emer. Ct. App.
1972); United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432, 452 (9th Cir.
1971); Great Falls Community TV Cable Co. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 238, 243 (9th Cir.
1969).
22. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197 (1969). McKart had been reclas-
sified from IV-A (sole surviving son) to I-A following the death of his mother, because
the local board found that the family unit had ceased to exist. Id. at 189. He did
not appeal the reclassification and failed to appear for either the physical or the induc-
tion. The court of appeals ruled that he was precluded from challenging the validity
of his classification because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
United States v. McKart, 395 F.2d 906 (6th Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court applied
the weighing test and reversed, excusing McKart's failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies. See generally Judicial Review 1296-302.
Washington University Open Scholarship
946 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:939
be excused and the Court will examine the validity of his defense.28
In United States v. Holby the Second Circuit applied the weighing
of interests test24 and noted that the burden of possible imprisonment
on the defendant was "exceedingly harsh. ' 2r Balanced against this bur-
den, the court found no compelling governmental interests: (1) appel-
lant had presented as complete a factual record as possible and the
Selective Service System had had five opportunities to exercise its exper-
tise and correct its mistakes; 20 (2) appellant had not attempted to evade
the System's procedures; 27 and (3) exempting the small number of sim-
ilarly situated registrants from re-exhausting their remedies would not
impair the operation of the System.2 8 The court, therefore, found no
justification for requiring the appellant to re-exhaust his remedies, not-
withstanding the apparent requirements of the Selective Service regula-
tions. 29
23. In Selective Service prosecutions, the validity of the defendant's classification
is judged by a "basis in fact" test that was first enunciated in Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114 (1946). The scope of judicial review under the test has been described
as the "narrowest known to the law." Blalock v. United States, 247 F.2d 615, 619
(4th Cir. 1957). Judicial review is limited to a determination, based on the Selective
Service file, whether there is any conceivable "basis in fact" for the classification given
by the local board. If the court can find no such basis for the classification, then
the induction order is invalid and no prosecution can stand. The local board will then
reclassify the registrant, usually consistent with the findings of the court. But see
United States v. Hayden, 445 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971) (after court found no basis
in fact for defendant's I-A classification and dismissed indictment, local board again
classified defendant I-A). See generally Note, Due Process in Selective Service Ap-
peals, 39 U. Cu. L. REv. 331, 331-34 (1972).
24. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); notes 22 & 23 supra and
accompanying text.
25. 477 F.2d at 653. Throughout its discussion of the issue of appellant's failure
to exhaust, the court reiterated its belief that appellant was fully entitled to the con-
scientious objector classification denied him by the System. Id. at 653-54. Under tra-
ditional analysis, such statements would be premature since any decision on the merits
of appellant's classification should come only after the threshold question of exhaustion
of remedies has been answered. Since the function of the exhaustion doctrine is to
bar judicial consideration of the merits of an allegation when the party seeking review
has not resorted to the available administrative remedies, to use a decision on the mer-
its as a basis for excusing the failure to exhaust completely negates the intended effect
of the doctrine. The same type of analysis appears in the cases to which the court
analogizes Holby. See United States v. Rabe, 466 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Hayden, 445 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971); Glover v. United States, 286 F.2d
84 (8th Cir. 1961); note 33 infra.
26. 477 F.2d at 654.
27. Id. at 655.
28. Id. at 654.
29. The local board had reopened appellant's file, see note 5 supra, but the court
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Additionally, the court identified Holby with a line of cases charac-
terized by United States v. Rabe,30 United States v. Hayden,31 and
Glover v. United States.32 An analysis of these cases in conjunction
with Holby reveals a less stringent application of the exhaustion doc-
trine in criminal prosecutions for refusal to submit to induction into
the Armed Forces. This relaxed application emphasizes the following
considerations: (1) whether the registrant presented a prima facie case
for the classification requested; 33 (2) whether callousness was evident
in the System's consideration of the request;34 and (3) whether the
registrant reasonably complied with the administrative requirements of
the System.3 Just how far the courts will go in applying the Holby
neglected to deal specifically with 32 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1973), which states that re-
opening of the file starts the classification process anew. The court implicitly acknowl-
edged that a reopening starts the process again, but nevertheless rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the regulation bars a court from considering what has transpired
previously within the administrative process. Had the court accepted the Govern-
ment's position, any registrant given a deferment or exemption could be forced con-
tinually to relitigate his status whenever the state director ordered that his file be re-
opened. Thus, it appears that a local board, upon reopening, must reconsider the regis-
trant's claim without reference to prior decisions, while the registrant is entitled to any
favorable effects from prior proceedings and appeals. Cf. United States v. Goss, Crim.
No. 71-1473 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 2, 1973), reprinted in 6 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3152 (1973),
in which the district court, in dealing with a factual pattern similar to Holby, appeared
to deny effect to the requirement of 32 C.F.R. § 1625.13. On motion to dismiss the
indictment, the court stated: "inhere appears to be no authority which requires a reg-
istrant to conduct a full appeal on an identical claim each time he is reclassified."
United States v. Goss, Crim. No. 71-1473-OJC (N.D. Cal., Nov. 27, 1972), reprinted
in 6 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3044 (1973).
30. 466 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1972).
31. 445 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1971).
32. 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961).
33. In each case, the courts made an initial decision that the registrant had pre-
sented a prima facie case for conscientious objector status. See note 25 supra. The
courts then proceeded to find a means for excusing the registrant's failure to exhaust.
Such an approach is consonant with Judge Magruder's belief that the exhaustion doc-
trine is purely discretionary, emanating from the equity courts. See Smith v. United
States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952). See also JAFFE 425-26. It should be noted
that under the provisions of 32 C.F.R. § 1661.8 (1973), it is quite simple for a regis-
trant to present a prima facie conscientious objector claim. A short statement of oppo-
sition to all wars, combined with an explanation of the religious, ethical, or moral be-
liefs on which the opposition is based, usually is sufficient.
34. See United States v. Rabe, 466 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 1971), citing Glover
v. United States, 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961), United States v. Williams, 420 F.2d
288 (10th Cir. 1970), and United States v. Davis, 413 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1969).
35. The extent to which a registrant must pursue his remedies does not appear def-
initively from the cases. The most that can be said at present is that the more a
registrant demonstrates a willingness to cooperate with the System, the more likely
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interpretation of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine in other types of
criminal prosecutions remains to be seen.86 At the very least, however,
it appears that in Selective Service cases the burden has shifted to the
Government to justify the application of the exhaustion doctrine on the
facts of each case.37
the courts are to excuse a later failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See United
States v. Holby, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Weaver, 474 F.2d 936
(7th Cir. 1973); Glover v. United States, 286 F.2d 84 (8th Cir. 1961); cf. United
States v. Shriver, 473 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1973) (court in dictum suggested a belief
that the registrant was entitled to conscientious objector classification, although the
Third Circuit refused to determine the question, since the registrant had failed to make
any personal appearance or appeal the I-A classification).
36. In cases involving other administrative agencies, the courts have relied exten-
sively upon McKart for the proposition that the doctrine of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is not to be inflexibly applied. See note 21 supra. Since MeKart pro-
vided the basis for the approach used by the court in Holby, application of a Holby-
type analysis arguably should govern exhaustion of administrative remedies cases out-
side the Selective Service System. The argument would seem to have special signifi-
cance in cases in which imprisonment and/or fines can result from a prosecution for
failure to comply with administrative rulings.
37. In past cases the Government has been able, with a few exceptions, to pre-
clude judicial review of the merits of a registrant's claim by showing that he had failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. If the trend exemplified by Holby continues,
however, courts will decide the merits of the registrant's claim, and then require the
Government to show that the effects on the System of allowing the registrant and
others like him to be excused from exhausting will outweigh the injury to the registrant
if he is convicted.
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